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Abstract
In this Note, the Present Draft is examined in light of the goals and history of Community
competition policy. After a discussion of patents and licensing, the previous drafts and criticisms
thereof are examined. An analysis of the recent decisions in Nungesser v. Commission (Maize
Seed) and Coditel v. Ciné Vog as they relate to the proposed regulation follows. Finally, it is suggested that the Commission’s present position, as evidenced by the Present Draft of the proposed
regulation, constitutes an appropriate balance between the demands of industry and the needs of
the Community.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS IN THE EEC:
A LOOK AT THE PROPOSED BLOCK
EXEMPTION FOR EXCLUSIVE PATENT
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The Commission' of the European Communities2 (Commission) circulated the Present Draft3 of its proposed block exemption 4

1. The Commission was created by the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, (EEC or Community) Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as
Treaty of Rome]. It is "the administrative or executive arm" of the EEC, the European Coal
and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. B. HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 412 (1979
& Supp. 1983); see infra note 2. The Commission acts in three general areas. First, it initiates
Community policy. See D. LASOK & J.W. BuDcE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 166 (1982). Second, it has a "wide range of
legislative and executive powers and functions." Id. at 168. Third, it is "the guardian of the
Community Treaties." Id. at 166. The Commission is especially interested in alleged violations of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome pertaining to competition. See Regulation 17, 5
J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962), 1 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH)
2401 [hereinafter cited as
Regulation 17]. Regulation 17 "establishes and defines the powers of the Commission in the
competition field." B. HAWK, supra, at 412.
2. There are three legally definable, treaty-based Communities in Europe. See D.
LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 14-25. They are the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom). See B. HAWK, supra note 1, at 411. The ECSC was created
by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in Paris on April 18, 1951. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140. It was originally made up of five organs. D. LASOK &
J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 13. These organs consisted of the High Authority, which was
the executive organ, the Consultative Committee, the Special Council of Ministers, the
Assembly, and the Court of Justice. Id. The treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom were
both signed by the ECSC countries in Rome in March 1957. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1;
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 295 U.N.T.S.
259.
The aim of each Community is different. The goal of Euratom "is to develop nuclear
energy, distribute it within the Community and sell the surplus to the outside world." D.
LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 17. The aim of the EEC is the economic integration of
the member states of the three Communities and its scope is therefore broader than that of
the other two Communities. Id. at 18.
The institutions of the EEC and Euratom were patterned after those of the ECSC. Id.
This resulted in a multiplicity of executive, judicial and legislative bodies. Id. Consequently,
the merger of the separate institutions was inevitable. Id. "A Convention relating to certain
Institutions common to the European Communities was concluded simultaneously with the
Rome Treaties and provided for the establishment of a single Court of Justice and a single
Parliamentary Assembly to serve all three Communities." Id.

EEC PATENT LICENSING

245

The need for further unification was still clear, Id. at 18-19. In May of 1965 the member
states instituted "a single Commission to replace the High Authority of the ECSC and the
Commission of the EEC and Euratom, and a single Council to replace the separate Councils
of the three Communities." D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 19. This Commission is
in charge of enforcing the competition laws of the EEC. See supra note 1.
The competition laws of the EEC involving enterprises are found in articles 85 through
90 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 1; see also D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at
385-402 (discussing articles 85-90). Article 85 deals with agreements which have an anticompetitive effect. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85 (for the text of article 85, see infra
note 9). Article 86 prohibits a firm's abuse of its dominant position "[t]o the extent of which
trade between any Member States may be affected." Id. art. 86. Article 87 directs the
Council to create detailed rules regarding competition. Id. art. 87; see D. LAsoK & J.W.
BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 385-86. Articles 88 and 89 contain temporary provisions which last
only until the Council implements article 87. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 88-89; see
D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 386. Article 90 is concerned with the application of
the rules of competition to undertakings controlled in some form or degree by the government
of a member state, or "public enterprises." Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 90.
3. Proposal for a Commission Regulation (EEC) on the Application of Article 85(3) of
the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, No. 84/CC/i [hereinafter
cited as Present Draft] (copy on file at the offices of the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
4. A block exemption automatically exempts the otherwise unlawful practices listed in
the regulation from the prohibition of article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 1. See D.
LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 392-93. They are created to expedite the exemption
process. Id. Regulation No. 19/65/EEC, 5 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. 36) 533 (1962), 1 COMMON
MKT. REP'. (CCH) 1 2717, gives the Commission the power to apply article 85(3) to certain
categories of agreements which merit article 85(3) exemption. See id.
There are three ways in which alleged anti-competitive behavior comes before the
Commission. First, it may come by way of the Commission's own investigation. See Regulation 17, supra note 1, art. 3. Second, the parties may notify, id. art. 4, the Commission of the
agreement in order to get either a "negative clearance," see id. art. 2, or an individual
exemption, see id. arts. 4-8, from an article 85 prohibition. Third, complaints to the Commission may come from third parties. Id. art. 3(2). Article 3(2) lists member states and
"[n]atural or legal persons and associations of persons, who show a justified interest" as those
parties entitled to make an application to the Commission for review of an agreement,
decision, or practice for possible article 85 or 86 violations. Id. art. 3(2).
Article 3 of Regulation 17 gives the Commission the power to require parties to terminate an agreement which, "acting on request or ex officio," it finds to be an infringement of
article 85, or article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Id. art. 3.
Article 4 calls for the notification of "agreements, decisions or concerted practices
referred to in Article 85, paragraph 1 . . . [and] [a]s long as such notification has not taken
place, no decision to issue a declaration under Article 85, paragraph 3, may be rendered." Id.
art. 4. Article 2 makes it possible for an enterprise, or an association of enterprises, to seek a
"negative clearance" from the Commission. Id. art. 2. This is simply a certification by the
Commission that, "according to the information it has obtained, there are, under Article 85,
paragraph 1, or Article 86 of the Treaty, no grounds for it to intervene with respect to an
agreement, decision or practice." Id. The "negative clearance" is restricted to the facts as
presented to the Commission at a certain time; therefore, any change in the facts may give
rise to a violation of article 85(1) or article 86. See B.I. CAWTHRA, PATENT LICENSING IN
EUROPE 27-28 (1978).
Articles 4 through 8 of Regulation 17 set up the rules which the parties and the
Commission must follow for granting of an individual exemption under article 85(3). Regula-
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for exclusive patent licensing agreements 5 in February, 1984. The
Fourth Draft" and Fifth Draft7 of the proposed regulation were
changed due to criticisms 8 of the Commission's strict view of the
types of agreements that should be exempt from scrutiny under
article 85 of the Treaty of Rome. 9 It has been the Commission's
tion 17, supra note 1, arts. 4-8. Article 4 deals with notification of new agreements. Id. art. 4.
Article 5 deals with notification of agreements existing at the time Regulation 17 went into
effect. Id. art. 5. Article 6 requires, with certain exceptions, that the Commission specify the
date from which the decision under article 85(3) shall take effect. Id. art. 6. Article 7 deals
with special provisions for existing agreements, and article 8 sets out the requirements for the
duration and revocation of the decision under article 85(3). Id. arts. 7, 8.
5. An exclusive patent licensing agreement is an agreement in which the patent holder
licenses the exclusive use of the patent to one licensee for a particular territory or technical
field. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS I 411(g) (1981).
6. Of the previous drafts only the fourth was officially published. Proposal for a
Commission Regulation (EEC) on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain
Categories of Patent Licensing, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 58) 12 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as the Fourth Draft].
7. In October 1983, the Commission circulated a fifth draft of the proposed regulation
under the same title as the Fourth Draft, supra note 6. See Proposal for a Commission
Regulation (EEC) on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Certain Categories of
Patent Licensing Agreements [hereinafter cited as Fifth Draft] (copy on file at the offices of
the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
8. Notice pursuant to Article 5 of Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC of 2 March 1965 on
the application of Article 85(3) the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices, 22 O.J. Eun. Comm. (No. C 58) 11 (1979). This is attached to the Fourth
Draft and "invites all interested parties to send their comments" regarding the proposed block
exemption to the Commission. Id.
9. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, at article 85. Article 85 states:
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and
shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by
associations of enterprises and concerted practices which are likely to affect trade
between the Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market, in particular
those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other
trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development or
investment;
(c) market-sharing or sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of
additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contract.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null and
void.
3. Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
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position that some provisions in patent licensing agreements may
work against the EEC goal of economic integration.1 0
In this Note, the Present Draft is examined in light of the goals
and history of Community competition policy. After a discussion of
patents and licensing, the previous drafts and criticisms thereof are
examined. An analysis of the recent decisions in Nungesser v. Commission" (Maize Seed) and Coditel v. Cind Vog1 2 as they relate to
the proposed regulation follows. Finally, it is suggested that the
Commission's present position, as evidenced by the PresentDraft of
the proposed regulation, constitutes an appropriate balance between the demands of industry and the needs of the Community.
I. EEC ORGANIZATION
Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands formed the European Economic Community (EEC) in
1957 by signing and ratifying the Treaty of Rome.13 The principal
goal of the EEC is to promote the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital within the Common Market.14 To ensure that

- any agreements or classes of agreements between enterprises,
- any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises, and
- any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute to
improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of
technical or economic progress while reserving to users an equitable profit resulting
therefrom, and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensible
to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the goods concerned.
Id.
10. See infra notes 255-85 and accompanying text.
11. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8805 [hereinafter
cited as Maize Seed].
12. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3381, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865.
13. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1. The number of member states increased in 1972,
with the accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, see Treaty of Accession of
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, Jan. 22, 1972, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. 1, 11 I.L.M.
397, and again in 1979 when Greece joined the Common Market, see Treaty of Accession of
the Hellenic Republic, May 28, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 9 (1979) 18 I.L.M.
897.
14. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 2, 3. For example, in order to facilitate these
goals, article 3(a) eliminates customs, duties, and quotas on the import and export of goods,
id. art. 3(a), and article 3(c) abolishes obstacles "to the free movement of persons, services
and capital" as between the member states, id. art. 3(c).
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no agreement interferes with this goal, article 85(1) of the Treaty
bars any agreement which has as an object or effect the "prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market."' 5 Article 85(2) renders null and void any agreement falling under article 85(1). 16
It is nevertheless generally recognized that some agreements
may be beneficial even though they prevent, restrict or distort
competition. 7 Under article 85(3),18 prohibited restrictions that
contribute to "the improvement of the production or distribution of
goods,""' or promote "technical or economic progress,"20 are exempt from article 85(1) liability if they meet two conditions. The
restrictions imposed must be "indispensable to the attainment of the
objectives" of the agreement, 2' and must not provide a firm with an
opportunity to "eliminate competition." 22 Article 85(3) applies to
23
any and all agreements having effect within the Common Market,
and the Commission is authorized to direct member states to take
24
the necessary steps to eliminate violations.
II. THE PROPOSED BLOCK EXEMPTION
A. Reasons for a Block Exemption for
Patent Licensing Agreements
1. Patents in General
A patent system has two goals. 5 The first goal is to reward
individual inventors for their inventions by removing the threat of

15. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85. For the text of article 85(1), see supra note 9.
16. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85. For the text of article 85(2), see supra note 9.
17. See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at 1 124-30.
18. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85(3). For the text of article 85, see supra note 9.
19. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85(3).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Control of Restrictive Business Practices in the European Economic Community, U.N. Doc. TD/B/6O8 paras. 7, 8, 49 (1977). "The rules of competition apply essentially
to restrictive business practices with effects in the Common Market." Id. para. 49.
24. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 89; see D. LASOK & J.W. BIUIE, supra note 1, at
171.
25. See P. DEMARET, PATENTS, TEIURTORIAL RESTICTIONS AND EEC LAw 3 (1978).
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competition for a term of years.26 The second goal is to "encourage
in the public interest the development of technology, of industrial
techniques and of new industries, thus contributing to the economic
and social development of the territory in which the particular
patent system is operative. ' 27 In essence, the patent system is a
balance between the desire for unfettered competition and the need
to promote technological progress.28
It should be noted that a patent is not a government created
"monopoly" in the antitrust sense;29 it gives the patent holder only
30
the right to exclude others from the protected information.
Though a patent may create a dominant position in the relevant
market for the limited life of the patent, a monopoly will not
necessarily result.3 ' Furthermore, the patent holder's exclusive
rights apply only with respect to manufacturing; they do not give
him the right to regulate the product once it is placed on the
market. 32 On the other hand, the patent does give the owner the
right to restrict the use of unpatented, or unpatentable, information
33
developed for use with the patent.

26. Id. at 4.
27. Confederation of British Industry, Industrial Panel Meeting: CBI submission'to the
European Commission, and-or the Office of Fair Trading, on the draft block exemption
regulation for patent licenses para. 2 (May 10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as CBI] (available
from the Confederation of British Industry, London, England) (commenting on the Fourth
Draft, supra note 6).
28. See P. DEMA=r,

supra note 27, at 8.

29. See K.P. Ewing, Antitrust Enforcement and the Patent System: Similarities in the
European and American Approach, Remarks before the Max Plank Institute 4 (Jan. 4, 1980)
(copy on file at the offices of the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
30. Id. at 5; see CBI, supra note 27, para. 3.
31. See K.P. Ewing, supra note 29, at 5. "In many instances in reality a patent will
confer little, if any, market power, and it certainly will not create a monopoly in the antitrust
sense." Id.
32. See P. AR=A, supra note 5, 1 411(0. "It is usually said that the 'first sale' of the
product exhausts the patentee's legitimate interest" to control the patented product. Id. The
patentee may not restrict a customer from using or reselling the patented product anywhere
he chooses, whether that customer is an ordinary consumer or a dealer. Id. This is known as
the "exhaustion of rights" doctrine. Id.; see, e.g., Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157
U.S. 659 (1895) (no restriction on dealer who purchased the product); Adams v. Burke, 84
U.S. 453 (1873) (no restriction on consumer allowed). See also B.I. CAWTHRA, supra note 4,
63-77 (discussing territorial restrictions).
33. See P. DEMAREr, supra note 25, at 8.
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2. Patent Licensing
It is sometimes in the interest of the patent holder to license the
use of the patent to one or more firms.3 4 Licensing may also have
procompetitive benefits. 3 5 With a license, the patent holder gives
up some of the exclusivity granted by the patent 3 which results in a
greater distribution of new technology.3 7 Furthermore, when the
patent ends, the licensee will be ready to compete actively with the
licensor and other licensees .38
One problem with licensing agreements is that the patent
holder may sometimes unlawfully try to extend his patent rights
through certain clauses in the agreement.3 9 These attempts are
usually considered anti-competitive and are generally prohibited
under relevant antitrust laws. 40 Ordinarily, parties entering into an

34. See P. ArEEDA, supra note 5, 1 410(b):
His reasons might include the following. (1) The patentee may think it more
profitable to license than to risk expansion beyond his usual geographic or product
specialty. (2) Industry-wide usage might increase consumer acceptance of the new
product and thus generate greater sales for the patentee than he could have generated himself. (3) On any new undertaking, moreover, the patentee may prefer to
avoid taking the entire risk of product and market development. (4) To occupy the
whole market might require a substantial investment which might be lost if the
patent were held invalid or if his rivals discovered an alternative to the patent. (5)
There may be an industry custom by which each patentee permits his rivals to use
his invention, albeit at a price. (6) A patentee might fear that occupying the whole
of a significant market invites antitrust troubles under [the relevant antitrust statute). (7) A second source of production reduces the risk of supply interruptions and
thus may help attract industrial patronage.
Id.
35. Id.; see P. DEMArET, supra note 25, at 36-37.
36. See CBI, supra note 27, para. 4. The patent grant gives the patentee exclusive rights
to the invention and in licensing its use he is relaxing this exclusivity by increasing the number
of parties who are allowed to use the invention. Id.
37. Id.; see P. AaxEoA, supra note 5, 1 410(b).
38. See Handler & Blechman, An American View of the Common Market's Proposed
Group Exemption for Patent Licenses, 14 INT'L LAW. 403, 407 (1980). Note that the "exhaustion of rights" doctrine, see supra note 32, applies to the licensee's "first sale." Handler &
Blechman, supra, at 409-10; see P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 411(f).
39. See K.P. Ewing, supra note 29, at 10.
40. Examples of the types of provisions which come under antitrust scrutiny include: 1)
tie-ins, see, e.g., Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)
(patent holder of motion picture projector could not limit its use to projection of certain nonpatented material); see also P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 1 530-56 (analyzing tying arrangements); 2) territorial restrictions, see infra notes 70-94, 243-90 and accompanying text; see
also P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 1 411(f) ("[Tlhe territorial restriction has been a frequent
vehicle for the elimination of competition between firms that would otherwise compete.");
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agreement containing such clauses notify4' the Commission in order
to get an individual exemption under article 85(3),4 or at least a
negative clearance. 43 To reduce the number of applications for
exemption, the Commission has proposed a block exemption for
44
exclusive patent licensing agreements .
B. The Fourth Draft
1. General Structure
The Fourth Draft45 of the proposed block exemption for exclusive patent licensing agreements46 is composed of thirteen articles. 47
Provisions in the first three articles have received extensive criticism. 48 Article 149 deals with obligations placed on the licensee or

B.I. CAWTHrA, supra note 4, at 63-76 (discussing territorial restrictions); 3) field of use
restrictions, see infra notes 95-102, 291-94 and accompanying text; see, e.g., General Talking
Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938) (defendant's licensing of use of
vacuum tube for use in home radios while retaining the rights to its use in theater amplifiers
was held permissible because use restrictions are not inconsistent with defendant's exclusive
patent rights); see also P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 425 (discussing field of use restrictions; 4)
restrictions on price, see B.I. CAWTHRA, supra note 4, 184-91; and 5) restrictions relating to
know-how, id., 130-69; see infra notes 103-20, 296-311 and accompanying text.
41. See Regulation 17, supra note 1, art. 4. For a discussion of the notification procedure, see supra note 4.
42. See supra notes 4, 17-24 and accompanying text.
43. Id.
44. See D. LAsox & J.W. BiuDxE, supra note 1, at 393. At the end of 1979 there were an
estimated 5000 applications for exemptions under article 85(3). Special Issue: Patent Licensing, 2 CoMPErIoN L. EuR. COMMUNITIES 99, 110 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Special Issue].

45. See Fourth Draft, supra note 6.
46. See supra note 5.
47. Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 14-18. Article 4 requires that any disputes regarding
provisions which fall under articles 1 or 3 which are settled by arbitration must be communicated to the Commission. Id. art. 4. Article 5 lists agreements, such as patent pooling and
licenses relating to plant breeding, to which the exemption does not apply. Id. art. 5. Articles
6 and 7 deal with the retrospective applicability of the Regulation to agreements existing or
amended before certain dates. Id. arts. 6, 7. Article 8 discusses how articles 6 and 7 apply to
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. Id. art. 8. Article 9 gives the Commission the
right to review a specific agreement under article 7 of Regulation 19/65, supra note 4, if it has
anti-competitive effects even though it falls under the block exemption. Id. art. 9. Article 10
lists the types of agreements to which the block exemption will apply. Id. art. 10. Article 11
defines "economic connections." Id. art. 11. Article 12 makes the Regulation applicable to
assignments of patents which have restrictions which fall under articles 1 or 3 of the
Regulation. See id. art. 12. Article 13 gives the date upon which the Regulation will go into
effect. Id. art. 13.
48. See, e.g., Special Issue, supra note 44 at 99-100 (listing the most criticized provisions); Siragusa, Technology Transfers under EEC Law: A Private View, 1982 FORDIHAM
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the licensor that the Commission deems so restrictive or disruptive
50
of competition that they fall under article 85(1) of the Treaty. If
these restrictions meet the requirements of article 1, they automatically meet the criteria of article 85(3) of the Treaty and are thereby
exempt from liability. 5
The obligations in article 252 are usually not violations of article 85(1).53 In order to reduce the number of formal requests, 54 and
to provide legal certainty, 55 the Commission grants article 2 restrictions an automatic exemption. 56 Article 357 lists restrictions that in
the Commission's view never meet the criteria of article 85(3), and,
therefore, require individual examination.58
Concurrently with publication of the Fourth Draft, the Commission requested criticisms 59 of the proposed exemption and received an overwhelming response60 from law firms, 6 ' trade associations,62 and other interested parties.6 3 Public meetings were held in
Brussels, Belgium, at which many of these individuals and groups
presented their comments to members of the Commission.6 4 Although many parts of the proposed regulation were discussed, most
of the criticism centered on five provisions: the turnover requirement;6 5 the field of use restriction;66 restrictions relating to know-

CoRp. L. INST. 95, 101-03 (discussing articles 1-3 and 9); see generally Handler & Blechman,
supra note 38, passim (criticizing provisions in articles 1-3).
49. See Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 14-15.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id. at 12-13.
52. Id. at 15-16.
53. Id. at 13; Siragusa, supra note 48, at 102.
54. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
55. See K.P. Ewing, supra note 29, at 13-14.
56. See Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 13.
57. Id. at 16-17.
58. Id. at 13.
59. See supra note 8.
60. See Special Issue, supra note 44, at 99.
61. See id. For example, the Brussels office of Cleary, Gottlieb, Stein & Hamilton, a
New York-based law firm, submitted a lengthy memorandum. Id.
62. See id. The Union of Industries of the European Communities (UNICE) and the
Confederation of British Industries (CBI) were among the trade organizations filing comments. Id. at 99, 100.
63. See id. For example, Laporte Industries Ltd. and Mr. Pierre Hug also testified at the
meetings. Id. at 99, 101.
64. Id. at 99. The meetings took place on October 9-11, 1979. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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69
how;6 7 obligations to pay royalties;6 8 and quantity restrictions.

2. Criticisms of the Provisions
a. The Turnover Requirement
Subsections 3 and 4 of article 1(1) exempt from article 85(1)
prohibition 70 provisions in patent licensing agreements containing
territorial sales restrictions. Section 3 exempts a grant of an exclusive territory to the licensee in which neither the licensor nor other
licensees may sell the patented product or product manufactured
using the patented process. 71 Section 4 allows provisions that prohibit the licensee from selling in the licensor's or another licensee's
territory. 72 However, not all agreements containing territorial sales
restrictions are exempt under this article. 73 The firm to be protected
by the restrictions must meet a size limitation set forth in article
1(2)(a).74 Only firms with a total annual turnover of no more than
100 million European Units of Account are exempt. 75 This total
annual turnover includes the sale of all goods and services by the
77
firm,7M and by other firms having "economic connections" with it.

67. Id. at 100.
68. Id. at 99.
69. Id. at 100.
70. Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 14.
71. Id. The provision exempts "the obligation on the part of the licensor to refrain from
selling the patented product or product manufactured by a patented process within the
licensed territory, or to impose a corresponding prohibition on other licensees." Id.
72. Id. The provision exempts "the obligation on the part of the licensee to refrain from
selling the patented product or product manufactured by a patented process within the
defined territory of the common market reserved by the licensor for himself or in the licensed
territories of other licensees." Id.
73. See id. at 13.
74. See id. at 13, 15.
75. Id. at 15. In 1979 E.U.A.100 million equalled approximately U.S.$140 million. See
Special Issue, supra note 44, at 104.
76. Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 15.
77. Id. "Economic connections" is defined in article 11 of the Fourth Draft as follows:
For the purposes of this Regulation, two undertakings shall be deemed to have
economic connections where one of them is in a position to exert a decisive influence
on the other, directly or indirectly, with regard to the exploitation of a patent, or
where a third undertaking is in a position to exercise such an influence on both of
them.
Id. at 18.
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The Commission states that the purpose of the turnover provision is to insure that "the exemption will not be available for a
number of firms which have particularly large financial resources
and which, moreover, hold the bulk of the patents in force in the
common market. ' 78 This is consistent with the Commission's competition policy. 7 By exempting small and medium-size firms, the
Commission is concentrating on the activities of those larger firms
which have the potential power to affect competition within the
territory of the Common Market. 0
The turnover requirement has been criticized on numerous
grounds. First, some critics argue that since a license reduces the
patent holder's exclusive rights, any restriction in the license is less
82
restrictive than no license at all. 8 1 Under the "inherency doctrine,
a patent holder has the right to "relax a portion" of his exclusive
rights to practice his invention by licensing, but he still retains the
83
right to place restraints on.the licensee.
A second claim is that if the Commission views licensing as
beneficial, any provision in the proposed regulation which deters
licensing is not beneficial. 84 More specifically, if the Commission's
premise that the large firms hold most of the patents is accepted,
then a provision that expressly operates against these firms would

78. Id. at 13.
79. The Commission has described the EEC's competition policy as having three goals:
market integration, competition and fairness. See B. HAWK, supra note 1, at 423-24, Supp.
193. "So far as competition policy is concerned, . . . [fairness] makes it necessary to adapt
the Community competition rules so as to pay special regard in particular to small and
medium firms that lack market strength." Id. at Supp. 195 (quoting COMM'N, NINTH REPORT
ON COMPETITION POLICY 9-11 (1980)).
80. Id. at Supp. 194. "An excessive concentration of economic, financial and commercial power can produce such far-reaching structural changes that free competition is no
longer able to fulfill its role as an effective regulator of economic activity." Id. (quoting
COMM'N, supra note 79, at 9-11 (1980)). The Commission "expressly acknowledges that
'social' and 'human' demands sometimes require a modification of results otherwise mandated on purely economic grounds." B. HAWK, supra note 1, at 423.
81. See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at 411(b); Handler & Blechman, supra note 38, at 407;
CBI, supra note 27, at para. 4.
82. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH No. 6, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING, 13 n.55 (1981).
83. Id. at 13.
84. See Handler & Blechman, supra note 38, at 409. "[T~he effect of limiting the
availability of territorial restrictions to companies having turnovers of more than 100 million
units of account is to discourage licensing by precisely those companies that have something
to license." Id.
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greatly deter licensing agreements.85 Technology would not be developed and disseminated as quickly because the large firms would
either not license at all, 86 or license only in certain territories. 87 The
effect would be to restrict the flow of technology within the Common Market, 88 or to make technology available only within certain
areas of the Common Market. 89 Finally, since the turnover requirement would directly affect multinationals,9 0 the flow of technology
into the Common Market would be impaired. 1
Three options were suggested to the Commission. Many argued that the Commission should remove the turnover requirement
altogether. 2 Failing this, it was thought the turnover requirement
should be limited to the relevant product market.9 3 As a last alternative, it was suggested that the Commission should allow these
' 94
large firms to establish "exclusive areas of solicitation.
b. Field of Use Restrictions
Some criticisms pertain to the qualification in article 2(1),
subsection 1, which requires that "the relevant products in each of
the fields from which the licensee is excluded differ in a material
respect from the products for which the license is granted. 95 Sometimes identical patented products may be used in more than one
way,96 and the patent holder may wish to license only one of the
uses. 9 7 A literal reading of article 2(1), section 1, would make such a

85. Id.
86. Id.at 408.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 408 n.25 and accompanying text.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 408-10; ABA Section of Antitrust Law, ABA Comments on the Proposal for a
Commission Regulation on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements 7 (Mar. 3, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA Memorandum] (memorandum submitted to the Commission in response to its request for criticisms on
the proposed regulation).
93. ABA Memorandum at 7-8.
94. See id. at 8. These exclusive areas of solicitation would be "territories where the
protected party would be the only authorized to solicit sales of the product although other
authorized persons could deliver there." Id.
95. See Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 15.
96. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 126 (1938).
97. Id.
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restriction unexemptable because the "relevant products" may not
"differ in material respects." 98
The same general arguments made against the turnover provision have also been made against the field of use provision." That
is, the provision would deter patent licensing, thereby impairing
the flow of technology into and within the Common Market. 0 0
Furthermore, two commentators, Handler and Blechman, have
argued that
there is no way that field-of-use restrictions can conceivably
have an adverse impact on economic integration. Unlike territorial restraints, which may in some cases divide a common market into exclusive geographic areas, perhaps coinciding with
national boundaries, for the exploitation of technology, field of
use restrictions cut across such divisions and promote the development of technology in commercial fields that extend geographically to the whole market.' 0'

The American Bar Association suggested to the Commission that it
change this ambiguous language because a field of use restriction is
02
actually procompetitive. 1
c. Restrictions Relating to Know-how
Article 3(10) and (11) respectively condemn clauses prohibiting
a licensee from using know-how after the expiration of the license, 10 3 and clauses providing for field of use restrictions on knowhow. 104

98. See Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 15. For example, the amplifiers in General
Talking Pictures were exactly the same, thus they did not "differ in material respects." Id.
99. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
100. Id.
101. See Handler & Blechman, supra note 38, at 420-21.
102. See ABA Memorandum, supra note 92, at 5-7.
103. See Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 16. The provision reads:
[A] clause prohibiting the licensee from using after the expiry of the agreement
secret manufacturing processes or other secret know-how communicated by the
licensor; this is without prejudice to any right of the licensor to require payments for
the use of such processes or know-how for an appropriate period, even after the
expiry of the agreement, but subject to paragraph 4(d) of this Article.
id.
104. Id. Article 3(11) states:
[A] restriction on the licensee against using secret manufacturing processes or other
secret know-how communicated by the licensor except for specified purposes; with-
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The Commission's view of know-how has been that it is less
important than a patent because the latter is protected by legislation whereas the former is not. 0 5 This attitude has come under
6 One of the chief criticisms of article 3(10) is that
vigorous attack. 10
it would not allow the licensor to stop the licensee from using the
know-how after the agreement expires. 0 7 The owner of a patent
will not want to license the know-how required to use the patent if
there is no assurance that the licensees will stop using the information once the agreement has ended. 0 8 The critics envision three
situations: the patent owner could be forced to sell the know-how at
a high one-time price rather than license it at a lower price; 09 the
patent owner could decide to grant a perpetual license to continue
to receive royalties from the licensee's use of the know-how;"10 the
patent owner could decide not to license anywhere in the Common
Market if he cannot impose field of use and other restrictions on
know-how."'
All of these possibilities would adversely affect small and medium-sized businesses. In the first situation, only large firms would
be able to afford the high one-time price to acquire the knowhow." 2 In the second, it may not be economically sound for a firm
to commit itself to a perpetual license."13 In the third situation, if
large international firms do not license within the Common Market, small and medium-sized firms will not be able to acquire the
latest technology." 4 Although the Commission attempts to protect

out prejudice to any right of the licensor to require payments at an appropriately
higher rate for any use by the licensee not covered by the agreement and not
protected by patents of the licensor.
Id.
105. See Siragusa, supra note 48, at 104.
106. See ABA Memorandum, supra note 92, at 2-5; CBI, supra note 27, paras. 21-25,
39(vii); Siragusa, supra note 48; Panel Discussion on International Technology Transfers in
the EEC, 1982 FOrDHAM CoRp. L. INST. 163, 172-75 [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion];
Special Issue, supra note 44, at 108-10; Handler & Blechman, supra note 38, at 410-15.
107. See supra note 103.
108. See ABA Memorandum, supra note 92, at 3-4; Handler & Blechman, supra note
38, at 413.
109. See Panel Discussion, supra note 106, at 174.
110. See Handler & Blechman, supra note 38, at 414.
111. Id.; see Panel Discussion, supra note 106, at 174-75.
112. See Panel Discussion, supra note 106, at 174.
113. See Handler & Blechman, supra note 38, at 414.
114. See id.

258

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:244

small and medium-sized firms through article 3(10), the critics view
11 5
the effects of the provision as contrary to that goal.
From the point of view of a small business licensor, the field of
use restriction in article 3(11) provides two opti6ns: the licensor
could either not license at all,"" or grant a license to the firm which
could exploit the know-how to its fullest, thereby providing him
with a maximum return on his license."17 Under the circumstances,
licensing to a large firm would be more profitable than licensing to
a small firm."'
The overall result of both provisions is to put small and medium-sized firms in a less attractive position vis-b-vis the larger
firms."' 9 It was suggested that the Commission re-evaluate its attitude toward know-how, at least in the context of patent licensing,
in order to allow agreements with restrictions relating to know-how
to come under the block exemption. 2 0
d. Royalties
3(4)(a)12 1 prohibits

Article
a requirement that the licensee pay
royalties "on products covered neither wholly nor partly by the
patent,' 12 1 nor manufactured by the patented process or "other
know-how communicated under the license" agreement. 123 The
problem created by this provision is that the licensee may want to
pay the licensor a percentage of its total annual sales as royalties
rather than basing the payment on the number of sales of the
patented product. 2 4 According to the critics, this article would
require constant monitoring of the licensee's production and sale of
the relevant products in order to assess the amount of royalties
due.125 They suggest that the Commission allow a measure of royal115. Id. at 413.
116. See supra note 112.
117. ABA Memorandum, supra note 92, at 4; see Panel Discussion, supra note 106, at
174-75.
118. ABA Memorandum, supra note 92, at 4; see Panel Discussion, supra note 106, at
174-75.
119. See Handler & Blechman, supra note 38, at 414.
120. See ABA Memorandum, supra note 92, at 4-5; CBI, supra note 27, para. 25.
Handler & Blechman, supra note 38, at 415.
121. See Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 16.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See ABA Memorandum, supra note 92, at 8.
125. Id. at 8-9. The Antitrust Section argues that:
[This prohibition would be] a wholly impractical obligation. Both parties would be
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ties based on the total annual sales of the licensee provided the
26
licensee is not coerced into such an agreement.
e. Quantity Restrictions
Article 3(6)127 precludes any restriction on the maximum number of products manufactured 2 8 or the number of operations employing the patent.2 9 The argument in favor of quantity restrictions is based on the "inherency doctrine"; 130 as the patentee retains
the right to altogether exclude others, any restriction in the license
3
is less restrictive than no license at all.1 '
3. Commission's Response
After evaluating criticisms of the Fourth Draft in 1979, the
Commission decided to amend the proposed block exemption. 32 In
the meantime, the Commission awaited 33 the European Court of
Justice's decision in Maize Seed, 34 which involved certain licensing
restrictions. 35 In June 1982,136 the Court of Justice issued a judgment in Maize Seed, 37 followed four months later by its decision in
Coditel v. Cin6 Vog. 38 These cases have had considerable impact
on the proposed regulation 39 and on analysis of Article 85 in general. 140
obligated to retain patent attorneys and technological specialists knowledgable
about the scope of patents under different national patent systems and knowledgable about the specific methods of manufacture, composition and workings of the
licensed products.
Id. at 9.
126. Id.; Handler & Blechman, supra note 38, at 423; CBI, supra note 27, para. 39(iii).
127. See Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 16.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
131. Id.
132. See Panel Discussion, supra note 106, at 166.
133. B. HAWK, supra note 1, at Supp. 326.
134. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8805.
135. See infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
136. The Fourth Draft was published in 1979, see supra note 6, and the Commission
decision from which Maize Seed arose was published in 1978, 21 O.J. Eve. COMM. No. L
286) 23 (1978), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,083 [hereinafter cited as Commission
Decision].
137. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8805.
138. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3381, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865.
139. See infra notes 388-423 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 162-82, 214-37 and accompanying text.
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III. THE MAIZE SEED AND CODITEL CASES
A. Maize Seed
1. The Facts
During 1960 and 1961, a French state agency141 (INRA) assigned its breeder's rights 42 to a newly developed variety of maize
seed143 to Kurt Eisele, a resident of the Federal Republic of Germany.1 44 In 1965, the parties reached a new agreement. 45 The new
agreement granted Eisele the exclusive right to distribute INRA's
maize seed in West Germany 4 and obligated INRA to prevent
other imports of its maize seed into West Germany. 47 In exchange
for the exclusive distribution rights, Eisele agreed to buy two-thirds
of the maize seed from INRA, the remaining one-third to be produced in West Germany by Eisele, or by someone under his supervision. 48 Eisele also agreed to set prices in agreement with INRA
and to refrain from selling competitors' seeds. "49
In 1973, Eisele brought an action for infringement of exclusive
rights against Louis David, K.G., (David), on the ground that
141. See Maize Seed, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 2018, 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8805, at 7512. "The Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (National
Institute for Agricultural Research) . . . is a French public body whose task it is, inter alia, to
carry out research with a view to improving and developing plant production." Id.
142. Id. at 2054, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8805, at 7537. Breeder's rights are
defined in the decision as:
those rights conferred on the breeder of a new plant variety or his successor in title
pursuant to which the production, for purposes of commercial marketing, of the
reproductive or vegetative propagating material, as such, of the new variety and the
offering for sale or marketing of such material are subject to the prior authorization
of the breeder.
Id.
143. See Commission Decision, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No L 286) 23, 24-25 (1978), 3
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 10,083, at 10,311-12 (regarding the economic importance of
maize seeds and Community and national regulations dealing with maize seeds).
144. See Siragusa, supra note 48, at 113. The rights were assigned rather than licensed
because German law required that the registered person be a German national. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Commission Decision, 21 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 286) 23, 27 (1978), 3
COMMON MET. REP. (CCH)
10,083, at 10,314.
147. Id. at 28, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,083, at 10,315. In the meantime, Mr.
Eisele had re-assigned his breeder's rights to Nungesser, KG, a partnership in which he was
the sole partner and holder of the majority of the capital. Id. at 27, 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 10,083, at 10,315. For the sake of clarity, the name Eisele will refer to both Mr.
Eisele and Nungesser, KG.
148. Id. at 28, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,083, at 10,315.
149. Id.
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David had imported INRA seed from France for resale in West
Germany. 50 The parties reached a court-approved settlement in
West Germany whereby David undertook to refrain from selling or
marketing the maize seed in West Germany without Eisele's authorization. 5 1'
In a 1978 decision, the Commission found that the restrictions
in the agreements between Eisele and INRA, and the settlement
between Eisele and David, violated article 85(1)152 and were not
subject to an individual exemption under article 85(3).1,3
2. The Court of Justice's 1982 Judgment
In 1982 the Court of Justice reversed the part of the Commission's 1978 decision that dealt with exclusive licensing restrictions
relating to the parties themselves' 54 and not third parties.1 55 It held
that the following provisions were not automatic violations of article 85(1):
An obligation upon INRA or those deriving rights through
INRA to refrain from having the relevant seeds produced or sold
by other licensees in Germany, and
An obligation upon INRA or those deriving rights through
INRA to refrain from producing or selling the relevant seeds in
Germany themselves.5 6
The Court upheld the Commission's decision that the following
restrictions were automatic violations of article 85(1):
- An obligation upon INRA or those deriving rights through
INRA to prevent third parties from exporting the relevant seeds

150. See Maize Seed, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 2020, 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8805, at 7547. Meanwhile, in June of that same year INRA granted an exclusive
license to the socidg anonyme Frangaise des Semences de Mais (FRASEMA) whereby the
latter received exclusive rights for all import purchases and export sales, and undertook to
prohibit re-importation of the seed into France. Commission Decision, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 286) 23, 27 (1978), 3 COMMON MKT. REP,. (CCH) 10,083, at 10,314.
151. Commission Decision, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 286) 23, 27 (1978), COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,083, at 10,314.
152. See id. at 36, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,083, at 10,323 (art. 1).
153. Id. (art. 2).
154. See Maize Seed, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 2027, 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8805, at 7548.
155. Id. at 2077, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8805, at 7548.
156. Id.
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to Germany without the licensee's authorization for use or sale
there, and
Mr. Eisele's concurrent use of his exclusive contractual
rights and his own breeder's rights to prevent all imports into
Germany and all exports to other Member States of the relevant
seeds. 157

In reaching this judgment, the Court made a distinction between "open" and "closed" exclusive licenses. 158 "Open" licenses are
those relating "solely to the contractual relationship between the
owner of the right and the licensee, whereby the owner merely
undert'kes not to grant other licenses in respect of the same territory and not to compete himself with the licensee on that territory." 15 "Closed" licenses are those in which "the parties to the
contract propose, as regards the product and the territory in question, to eliminate all competition from third parties, such as parallel importers or licensees for other territories.' ' 6 0 The Court's conclusion was that "in a case such as the present, the grant of an open
exclusive license

. . .

is not in itself incompatible with Article 85(1)

of the Treaty."' 6'
This conclusion is significant because the Court made what
some consider a radical shift in the analysis of article 85.162 The
Court did not find that the "open" exclusive license violated article
85(1) but still meets the requirements for an individual exemption
under article 85(3). 163 Instead, it decided that the agreements did
not violate article 85 at all 6 4 because of these factors: 5 (1) the
nature of the product; 6 (2) the novelty and importance of the
transferred technology; 6 7 (3) the investment risks assumed by the

157. Id. at 2068, 3

COMMON MKT.

REP. (CCH)

8805, at 7544.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.

161. Id. at 2069, 3 COMMON
162.
163.
164.
(CCH)
165.
166.
167.

MKT. REP. (CCH)
8805, at 7544.
See B. HAWK, supra note 1, at Supp. 326-33; Siragusa, supra note 48, at 199.
See Siragusa, supra note 48, at 119.
See Maize Seed, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 2068-69, 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
8805, at 7544.
Id. at 2069, 3 COMMON MKT. RE'. (CCH) 8805, at 7544.
Id.
Id.

1984]

EEC PATENT LICENSING

licensee; 6 8 and (4) the development of interbrand competition. 6
The opinion does not specify which of these factors is the most
important, 170 or whether additional factors might also be applicable or important. 171 However, commentators see in this case the
possible introduction of a "rule of reason" type analysis into Community competition law.17 2 Under such an analysis, the issue before
the Court is whether an agreement that prevents, restricts or distorts competition is justifiable under a particular set of facts and,
therefore, does not fall under article 85(1).173 The introduction of
such an analysis into the interpretation of article 85(1) "would
constitute a radical if not revolutionary departure from current
EEC enforcement policy and practice.' 1 74 Consequently, one of the
most important questions raised by this judgment is whether the
Court's reasoning is applicable to all technology transfers, or lim75
ited to the special field of breeder's rights. 1
It is significant that the Court expressly rejected the claim that
breeder's rights should not come under articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty because the special nature of the rights makes them different
from other industrial property rights. 17 The reasoning in Maize
Seed, therefore, "could be applicable to patent licenses and
77
knowhow transfers, and perhaps to trademark licenses as well."1
This would be true "at least where the products concerned involve
78
considerations analogous to those raised in the Maize Seed case." 1
The Commission has been reluctant to read any type of rule of
reason analysis into the Maize Seed decision. 79 Indeed, some of its
members have warned of the folly of extending the reasoning of the
Court of Justice beyond the facts of any particular case.180 Nonethe-

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Siragusa, supra note 48, at 121.
171. B. HAWK, supra note 1, at Supp. 332.
172. Id.at Supp. 331; Siragusa, supra note 48, at 141-42.
173. See Siragusa, supra note 48, at 119.
174. B. HAWK, supra note 1, at Supp. 333.
175. See Siragusa, supra note 48, at 137.
176. Id.
177. Id.at 138.
178. Id.
179. B. HAWK, supra note 1, at Supp. 331.
180. See Johannes, Technology Transfer under EEC Law-Europe between the Divergent Opinions of the Past and the New Administration:A ComparativeLaw Approach, 1982
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less, it cannot be denied that in the Maize Seed case, the balancing
process commonly used to determine whether an agreement could
be exempt under article 85(3)181 was shifted to determine whether
2
the agreement comes within the scope of article 85 at all.18
B. Coditel
1. The Facts
In July of 1969, a Belgian film distribution company, Cin6
Vog, received the exclusive right from a French producer 83 to show
a certain film' 8 4 in Belgium for seven years. 8 5 This right could not
be exercised until forty months after the first showing of the film in
Belgium. 18 6
The producer later assigned the right to broadcast the same
17
film in the Federal Republic of Germany to German television.
The film was shown in Germany in January of 1971 where three
Belgian cable television companies, Coditel, picked it up and forwarded it to their cable subscribers in Belgium. 88 Cin6 Vog
brought an action against Coditel charging infringement of its

copyright. 189
The Tribunalde Premiere Instance ruled in favor of Cin6 Vog
in June of 1975,110 and the decision was appealed.'"' In 1981 the
Belgian Cour de Cassation, while rejecting part of the lower court's

CORP. L. INST. 65, 69. ("One must be cautious in generalizing [Court of Justice]
judgments beyond the issues at stake.")
181. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. The producer was Les Films La Boetie. Coditel v.Cind Vog, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 3381, 3398, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865, at 8173.
184. The film was "Le Boucher." Id. at 3384, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865, at
8173.
185. Id.
186. The first performance of the film in Belgium took place on May 15, 1970. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. In 1979, the Cours D'Appel, Brussels, held inter alia, "first that the Coditel
companies required the authority of Cin6 Vog to show the film . . .basing its decision upon
the Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, . . . secondly that a
performing right was part of the specific subject matter of copyright and that consequently
Article 85 did not apply .... Id. Coditel appealed.
FoRDHAM
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reasoning, 192 took the view that the rest of the issues in the case
raised a question of interpretation of Community law. 9 3 It stayed
the proceedings 19 4 and, pursuant to article 177 of the Treaty, 19 5
presented a question to the Court of Justice.""
The question consisted of three parts. The court first asked
whether on the facts, the agreement between Cin6 Vog and the
French producer constituted a violation of article 85, sections 1 and
2.197 Second, whether article 36 of the Treaty9 8 would allow the
application of article 85 to the agreement. 19 9 Third, whether the
assignee's right was protected through independent legal status
which did not properly allow the application of article 85 to the
agreement 200
2. The Court's Judgment
In answering the question, the Court used a two step approach. 20 1 It first emphasized the distinction between the "existence" 202 of a right as a result of member state legislations, and the
"exercise" of that right.2 0 3 Although the exercise of that right might
prove "incompatible"2 0 4 with article 85 by preventing, restricting or
distorting competition, its mere existence cannot be condemned. 20 5
The Court cited two of the factors discussed in Maize Seed to show

192. The Cours D'Appel rejected the appellant's submission relating to infringement
under the Berne Convention. Id. at 3384-85, 3 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8865, at 8173.
193. Id. at 3385, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865, at 8173.
194. Id.
195. Id.Article 177 provides for the referral of a question which deals with the interpretation of Community law by a national court to the Court of Justice. See Treaty of Rome,
supra note 1, art. 177.
196. Coditel, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3381, 3385, 3 COMMON MET. RFP. (CCH)
8865, at 8173.
197. Id.
198. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 36. "Article 36 allows the Member States to
derogate from their obligations on several grounds provided such derogations do not constitute 'a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade.' " D. LAsoK &

J.W.

BFuDGE,

supra note 1, at 360.

199. Coditel, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3381, 3385, 3 COMMON MKT.
8865, at 8173.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 3401, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865, at 8183-85.
202. Id., 3 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8865, at 8184.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.

REP.

(CCH)
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that the mere existence of the exclusive grant did not violate article
85.206 It mentioned the need to protect the licensee because of the
investment risks common to the film industry207 and the need to
20 8
promote interbrand competition.
The Court then applied this distinction to the facts before it.20
It held that although the licensee had been granted exclusive exhibition rights in a member state, and consequently the right to prevent
others from showing the film in that country for a specified period, 210 no automatic violation of article 85 existed. 21 1 The Court
noted that the violation might be in the exercise of the exclusive
right to the film 2 2 but that it lacked enough information to decide
this issue. 21 3 The Court, therefore, instructed the national court to
21 4
make the necessary inquiries into this area.
C. The Effects of Maize Seed and Coditel on Exclusive Agreements
Maize Seed developed two categories of exclusive licensing
agreements: "open" and "closed." 21 5 "Open" agreements place restrictions on the parties to the agreement and are not per se unlawful.2 16 "Closed" agreements restrict third parties and, therefore,
violate article 85.217 Whether the grant of an "open" license violates
21 8
article 85 depends on a number of factors set out by the Court.
One question raised by this distinction is whether unilateral enforcement of exclusive rights by the licensee in order to prohibit
third parties from infringing on these rights causes an "open" li-

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See id.
Id.at 3402, 3 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 1 8865, at 8184.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 159, 162 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157, 160 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.

Id. at 3401, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865, at 8184-85.
210. Id., 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865, at 8184.
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cense to automatically become "closed. ' 21 9 A second question is
whether, if the rule of reason analysis of Maize Seed applies to
technology transfers in general,22 0 it can be extended to agreements
22
that do not involve the transfer of technology at all. '
Coditel v. Cin4 Vog may shed some light on these questions. In
Coditel, the Court emphasizes the distinction between the existence
and the exercise of these rights,22 2 and notes that the existence of
exclusive rights implicitly allows the owner to restrict third parties. 22 3 The Court states that the analysis should be whether or not
the "exercise" of the right, not its "existence," had the object or
effect of preventing, restricting or disrupting competition within
the Common Market. 224 Consequently, an "open" license may become "closed" as a result of the unilateral exercise of the exclusive
right if it violates an article of the Treaty.2 2 5 Conversely, where
there is no other violation of the Treaty, the exercise of the rights
granted under an "open" licensing agreement in order to prohibit
the actions of third parties need not automatically create a "closed"
license. 226 It is the reasonableness of the exercise that should be
examined.227
The Court mentioned only two of the Maize Seed factors in
finding that the existence of an exclusive license is not within the
ambit of article 85: protection of the licensee due to the investment
risks of the industry,2 28 and promotion of interbrand competition.2 29
230
This analysis is "clearly grounded in a rule of reason approach."
It appears that with Coditel the Court takes the rule of reason
approach out of the specific area of technology transfers and into a

219. See Siragusa, supra note 48, at 136-37.
220. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
221. Siragusa, supra note 48, at 138-41.
222. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 202-03, 212 and accompanying text.
224. Coditel v. Cing Vog, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3381, 3401, 3
RE. (CCH) 8865, at 8184.
225. See Siragusa, supra note 48, at 132-37.
226. See id.
227. See supra notes 162-73, 206-08 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
229. Id.
230. Siragusa, supra note 48, at 138-39.
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broader area of application. 3' Thus, the radical shift2 32 implicit in
233
Maize Seed is reinforced by Coditel.
There is disagreement about how these two cases should be
interpreted, 234 but there is no question as to their importance.2 35 At
the very least, they are developments in Community law that affect
the way in which the Commission must look at exclusive patent
licensing agreements,2 3 and specifically the way in which it ap2 37
proaches revision of the proposed block exemption.
IV. THE FIFTH DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED
BLOCK EXEMPTION
The Fifth Draft 38 of the proposed block exemption represented the Commission's reaction to the criticism of the Fourth
Draft239 and recent developments in Community competition
law.240 Although certain strongly criticized provisions remained
intact in either form or effect,2 41 the changes in the Fifth Draft
show that the Commission was aware of the need for a new attitude
with respect to the kind of agreements it would place within the
242
block exemption.

231. Id. at 138-41. According to Siragusa:
The Court's holding goes beyond the Maize Seed case in that it applies to performance rights for a film and therefore does not involve any transfer of technology.
Thus by holding that the grant of the exclusive rights did not per se violate Article
85(1), the Court adopted a rule of reason analysis where no technology transfer was
involved.
Id. at 138.
232. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
234. Compare Siragusa, supra note 48, passim (favoring rule of reason interpretation)
with Johannes, supra note 180, at 69 (warning against looking beyond facts of any particular
case). See generally Panel Discussion, supra note 106 (differing views of Maize Seed).
235. See Panel Discussion, supra note 106.
236. The Court of Justice is the highest body in the EEC and the Commission must
apply the law in accordance with the Court's rulings. Caspari, State Aid in the EEC, 1983
FORDIIAM CoRP. L. INST. 1, 5.

237. See infra notes 388-423 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 7.
239. See infra notes 243-327 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 388-423 and accompanying text.
241. For example, article l(1), sections 3 and 4 of the Fourth Draft have been consolidated in the Fifth Draft, but they are still limited by the turnover requirement of article 1(2),
section a. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
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A. The Turnover Requirement
Article 1(1), section 1, of the Fifth Draft 43 combines article
1(1), sections 3 and 4 of the Fourth Draft.2 44 It exempts import and
export restrictions by the licensing parties, subject to the turnover
provision in article 2(1), section 1.245
The Commission grants the power to impose territorial restrictions only to undertakings which required "protection against the
risk of investment. 2 46 According to the Commission, large undertakings have "considerable financial capacity" 247 and, therefore, do
not need as much protection as small and medium-sized businesses.2 48 The availability of exemption for territorial sales restrictions is based on a measure of the firm's annual turnover2 49 because,
in the Commission's view, this is the only practical objective indica20
tion of a firm's financial capacity.
The Commission's desire to retain the provision is probably
based on the idea that there is no valid economic reason for allowing territorial sales restrictions. 251 An economic examination of territorial sales restrictions is beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, a summary of Paul Demaret's excellent analysis is helpful in

243. Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 9.
244. Compare Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 9 ("without prejudice to Article 2(1)(1),
restrictions on the imports or exports of the patented product or a product manufactured
using the patented process (licensed product) made by the contracting parties within the
common market.") with supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
245. Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 9.
246. Id.at 4.
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. id.; see id.at 10 (art. 1.2(a))
250. See Panel Discussion, supra note 106, at 168. Mr. Johannes explained the Commission's attitude toward the turnover provision:
We know that the turnover limitation is very much contested but when we asked
industry and member states whether they can provide an alternative, there was
none. The imaginable alternatives are: turnover in the licensed product, market
share of the licensed product, and number of employees. The last is the worst,
everybody agrees; turnover in the licensed product is a business secret which the
companies concerned do not want to make known and market share is, theoretically, the best; but generally smaller and medium-sized companies do not know
their market share and if they know it they are not willing to make it known. Since
there is a growing tendency in Europe that all companies will be obliged to publish
their turnovers, we have stuck to this criterion as, in theory, only the second best but
in practice the only available figure.
Id.
251. See P. D^MA=r, supra note 25, at 41-58.
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understanding the Commission's position on territorial sales restric252
tions.
In examining the possible purposes parties might have for
including territorial restrictions in licensing agreements, Demaret
makes a number of distinctions. 253 First, he distinguishes between
natural barriers that prohibit cross-sales between territories and
territorial restrictions used to prevent cross-sales when no natural
barriers exist.25 4 Where no natural boundaries exist, he further
distinguishes between those situations in which one firm is licensed
within the territory and those in which several competing firms are
licensed .255
In the case of a single licensee, he examines five arguments in
favor of territorial sales restrictions.25 6 The first of these is the "cost
argument," which essentially is that the licensee or patentee needs
territorial restrictions to prevent sales from other licensees having
lower costs. 2 57 Demaret finds this argument "irrelevant," because
the patentee would want to license firms which are more efficient
and have lower cost conditions than he does. 258 "Thus, one may
expect the patentee to license the firm in each region that can
259
supply customers located in that region at the lowest cost.A second purpose may be "territorial discrimination,"
whereby the patentee restricts "the licensees established in the
lower price territories (and paying lower royalty rates) from selling
in the higher price territory. ' 26 0 According to Demaret, this is an
inefficient instrument of economic discrimination 26 ' because, under
the "exhaustion of rights" doctrine, 6 2 the patentee could not prevent the resale of products by his buyers, by his licensee's buyers, or
23
by subsequent buyers.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See infra notes 283-90 and accompanying text.
See P. DEMARET, supra note 25, at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 32.
P. DEMArET, supra note 27, at 45-46.
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A third purpose for creating territorial sales restrictions may be
collusion between competitors, especially if the patent has little
economic value. 264 In that case, members of the industry may want
to license the patent not for its economic value but because the
license may "serve as a convenient, if less obvious, shelter for collusive behavior.-

265

Fourth, the market power of licensees within a territory may
266
force the patentee to include territorial restrictions in the license.
An example of this would be where two firms, each dominant
within its own territory, and therefore the only logical licensee in
that territory, are "potential competitors.

' 26 7

Each firm, because of

its strong market power, might demand that the patentee restrict
the other "potential competitor" licensee from selling in its territory. 268 Both would safeguard their positions by eliminating "potential competition."269

The fifth ground for supporting territorial sales restrictions is
the "development argument.

'270

This is based on the idea that

without exclusive territorial restrictions no licensees would take the
investment risks necessary "to adapt the invention to the characteristics of a particular market or to bring a basic invention to the level
of commercial exploitation.

' 271

Demaret responds that a territorial

manufacturing restriction would be enough to give the licensee
272
sufficient protection for his investment risks.
Where several firms are licensed per territory, neither the
collusion theory nor the market power of the potential patentee
theory explains the use of such a licensing structure. 27 3 The only
possible reasons for this structure would be that "(1) territorial
discrimination is profitable, and (2) the grant of a single license per
territory would mean a lower volume of royalties for the paten-

264. Id.

265. Id.
266. Id. at 49-50.
267. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964) (discussing
the potential competition doctrine).
268. See P. DEMAREmr, supra note 25, at 49.

269. See Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 174.
270. P. DEMAXrE,

271. Id. at 50.
272. Id. at 50-51.
273. Id. at 53.

supra note 25, at 50-53.
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tee. ' 274 However, because of the "exhaustion of rights" doctrine,
the licensor would find it hard to keep different parts of the domestic market separate. 275 Thus, where a domestic licensing system
includes territorial sales restrictions, "the existence of several competing licensees per territory and discriminatory royalty rates has
2 76
little practical relevance."
When natural barriers prevent actual or potential competition
between firms in different territories, economic discrimination need
not be imposed through territorial sales restrictions.2 77 The natural
barriers would make it feasible to have different royalty rates for
278
each territory.
Finally, Demaret proposes two rules regarding territorial restrictions. 27 The first is that territorial sales restrictions in patent
licensing agreements should be treated as illegal restraints of
trade 280 because "territorial sales restrictions may serve as a tool to
allocate markets between competitors. Licensing one firm per territory should be prohibited, therefore, unless one can demonstrate
that this procedure constitutes an indispensable instrument for
achieving justifiable patent policy purposes. 2 81 The second rule
proposed by Demaret is that territorial manufacturing restrictions
should be dealt with on a case by case basis because they do not
present as much of a threat to trade as territorial sales restric282
tions.
Thus, an economic analysis suggests that there is usually no
valid economic reason to allow territorial sales restrictions in licensing agreements.2 83 However, noneconomic values also play a large
role in the Commission's competition policy. 28 4 The principal goal
of the EEC is the creation of a common market through economic

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. Id.at 54.
278. Id.
279. Id.at 55-58.
280. Id.at 55.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 57-58.
283. See supra notes 251-82 and accompanying text.
284. B. HAWK, supra note 1, at Supp. 201. "[T]he Commission expressly acknowledges
that social and human demands sometimes require a modification of results otherwise
mandated on purely economic grounds." Id.
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integration of the member states. 285 One danger of integration is
"that formerly isolated smaller (and even medium-sized) firms may
find it difficult to compete successfully with larger firms located
both within and without the Common Market. ' 286 The Commission exempts small and medium-sized firms that meet the requirements of the regulation because these firms need greater protection
for their investment.2 87 Thus, the Commission is interested less in
undistorted competition 288 than in preservation of "the right
amount of competition" in order to achieve the Treaty's goal of
economic integration. 289 It should also be remembered that large
firms not within the block exemption may still get individual exemptions for territorial sales restrictions under article 85(3) .290
B. Field of Use Restrictions
Although the Commission has retained the field of use provision, it has removed the ambiguities from the Fourth Draft.2 9 The
requirement that "the relevant products in each of the fields from
which the licensee is excluded differ in material respect from the
2 93
29 2
products for which the license is granted" has been changed.
The licensor may now restrict the use to one or more "distinct

285. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 2, 3.
286. B. HAWK, supra note 1, at Supp. 200.
287. See Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 4.
288. B. HAWK, supra note 1, at Supp. 194, (quoting COMM'N, supra note 79, at 9-11). It
is the Commission's position that:
[T]he perpetual struggle to unify the common market is not the only objective of the
system to insure undistorted competition. It is an established fact that competition
carries within it the seeds of its own destruction. An excessive concentration of
economic, financial and commercial power can produce such far-reaching structural changes that free competition is no longer able to fulfill its role as an effective
regulator or economic activity. Consequently, the second fundamental objective of
the Community's competition policy must be to insure that at all stages of the
common market's development there exists the right amount of competition in order
for the Treaty's requirement to be met and its aims attained.
Id.
289. Id.
290. A block exemption automatically exempts those agreements which fall within it
without the need for notification, see D. LAsoK & J.W. Bnmc:E, supra note 1, at 393, but
those agreements which do not fall within the block exemption have to be notified through
the regular process. See supra note 4.
291. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 95.
293. See Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 12.
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technical fields of application."'2 94 This provision has also been
made applicable to any know-how communicated for use with the
295
patent.
C. Restrictions Relating to Know-How
The Commission has substantially changed its position regarding the status of know-how in patent licensing agreements.2 16 The
changes make it possible to have territorial restrictions and field of
use restrictions on know-how that is communicated for proper use
29 7
of the patent.
Article 1(1), section 6,298 allows the territorial restrictions of
article 1(1), sections 1-5,2 a9 to be applied to know-how having a
"close connection with the exploitation of one or more of the licensed patents. 30 0 This, of course, is applicable only to small and
medium-sized firms pursuant to article 1(2)(a) .301 Nevertheless, the
Commission has allowed all firms to impose field of use restrictions
on know-how communicated for the "utilization of the patented
30 2
invention.
The revision of article 1 greatly expands the scope of the
proposed exemption; a number of agreements that would not have
come under the previous drafts are encompassed by the Fifth
Draft.30 3 This change signals the Commission's recognition that
know-how is an important element in patent licensing agree304
ments.

294. Id.
295. See id. at 2-3, 12.
296. See infra notes 297-311 and accompanying text.
297. See Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 10 (article 1.1(6)).
298. Id.
299. Id.at 9-10.
300. Id.at 10.
301. Id.Article 1(2) expressly provides that "[i]mport and export restrictions shall be
exempted pursuant to paragraph 1(1) and (6) only" if they meet the requirements of article
1.2(a). Id.
302. Id. at 12 (article 2.1(2)).
303. See supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
304. Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 2. Both the preamble to the Fourth Draft, and the
preamble to the Fifth Draft, state that it is "appropriate" to extend the Regulation to knowhow provisions. Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 13; Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 2. However,
the Fifth Draft further recognizes that "mixed [patent/know-how] agreements are very
common." Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 2.
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Article 3(10), 305 however, has not been changed. The licensee
still may not be prohibited from using the know-how after the
expiration of the agreement. 306 "The idea behind this treatment of
know-how licensing is that know-how as a softer category of industrial property should not be in a better position under the competition rules than patent rights. ' 30 7 Another reason may be that knowhow is usually not one datum, but a continuing flow of new
information during the life of the agreement.30 8 Access to such
information is cut off once the agreement ends, thereby rendering
the licensee's product less technologically advanced than the prod30 9
uct using the new know-how.
The changes in the know-how provisions do not fully meet the
needs of industry because they do not yet consider know-how an
important and valuable industrial property in its own right.3 10 The
changes do, however, suggest that the Commission is slowly liberal31
izing its attitude toward know-how. 1
D. Royalties and Quantity Restrictions
The royalty provision3 1 2 has been rewritten to make it easier to
understand, 3 3 but it still requires that the payment of royalties be
31 4
based on products "at least partly covered by a licensed patent.The suggestion that it would be less burdensome to base the payment on a percentage of the licensee's annual turnover31 5 was not

305. Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 15. Article 3, however, has been reworded. See infra
note 306.
306. Compare Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 15 (article 3(10)) with Fourth Draft, supra
note 6, at 16 (article 3(10)).
307. van der Esch, Industrial Property Rights under EEC Law, 1983 FORDHlAM CORP.
L. INST. at -.
308. See Panel Discussion, supra note 106, at 171, 178.
309. Id. at 178.
310. See generally Bleeke & Rahl, The Value of Territorial and Field-of-Use Restrictions in the InternationalLicensing of UnpatentedKnowhow: An Empirical Study, I Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 450 (1979) (study indicating that the value of know-how licensing is probably
greater than the value of patent licensing).
311. See supra notes 309-11 and accompanying text.
312. Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 14 (article 3(4)(a), (b)).
313. Compare Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 14 (article 3(4)(a), (b)) with Fourth Draft,
supra note 6, at 16. (article 3(4)(a), (b)).
314. Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 14 (article 3(4)(a), (b)).
315. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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accepted,316 probably because the Commission views this as an
317
extention of patent rights to unrelated products.
Maximum quantity restrictions are still prohibited by article
3(6)318 because this type of restriction may have the same effect as
319
an export ban.
Either of these restrictions, of course, may be eligible for an
32
individual exemption 320 or a negative clearance. '
E. Article 4 Exemptions
A new provision has been added to the Fifth Draft which
provides for a
simplified procedure whereby the parties to agreements which
do not come within the terms of Articles 1 or 2 and yet do not
contain any of the restrictions of competition listed in Article 3
can establish, after notification but without a formal decision,
the validity of their agreements and thus attain legal cer322
tainty.
In essence, the new article 4 grants an automatic exemption for any
agreement not opposed by the Commission within six months of
notification. 3 3 This article gives the block exemption a "broader
scope and greater flexibility. ' 32 4 It gives certain clauses in patent
licensing agreements the "legal presumption" of inclusion in the
block exemption if they are similar in effect to those exempted in
article 1.325
The changes to the proposed block exemption indicate that the
Commission was mindful of outside criticisms when revising the
32 71
regulation .326 This becomes clearer in the Present Draft.

316. See Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 14 (article 3(4)(a) and (b)). The nonacceptance is
evinced by the fact that no change was made.
317. See Fourth Draft, supra note 6, at 13.
318. See Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 15 (article 3 (6)).
319. See id. at 6.
320. See supra note 4.
321. id.
322. Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 7.
323. See id. at 16-17 (article 4).
324. van der Esch, supra note 312, at -.
325. id. at .
326. Compare supra notes 70-140 and accompanying text (discussion of Fourth Draft)
with supra notes 243-325 and accompanying text (changes in Fifth Draft).
327. See infra notes 327-87.
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V. THE PRESENT DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED
BLOCK EXEMPTION
The Present Draft32 8 of the block exemption reflects a careful
analysis by the Commission of the comments it received on the
Fourth and Fifth Drafts of the proposed regulation. 3 The changes
made in the Present Draft show that the Commission is trying to
create a regulation that addresses the needs of industries in the
330
Common Market.
A. The Turnover Requirement
The sharply criticized size limitation for territorial sales restrictions 33' has been removed from the proposed block exemption. 332 Article 1(1)(5)333 of the Present Draft allows a licensor to
prohibit licensees from pursuing "active sales" policies in the territories of other licensees.3 34 Thus, a licensing agreement may prohibit the licensee from engaging advertising specifically directed at
these territories, 335 the creation of any branch or the maintenance
of any distribution depot there,336 or the general solicitation of
customers in those territories. 337 Nonetheless, the licensee can engage in "passive sales, - 338 filling unsolicited orders from customers
339
in the territory of another licensee.
To ensure that such "passive sales" are not prevented, sections
340
10 and 11 have been added to article 3 of the Present Draft.
Section 10 would automatically exclude the agreement from the
block exemption if, "without objectively valid reasons, one party
refuses to meet demand from users or intermediaries in his territory

328. Present Draft, supra note 3.
329. See supra notes 70-140, 238-327 and accompanying text.
330. See infra notes 331-423 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 70-94 and accompanying text.
332. Commission Working Document, Re: Draft Commission Regulation (EEC) concerning the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing
agreements, No. IV/84/1 (copy on file at the offices of the Fordham International Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Working Document].
333. Present Draft, supra note 3, at 8.
334. Id.; see Working Document, supra note 332, at 2.
335. Present Draft, supra note 3, at 8; see Working Document, supra note 332. at 2.
336. Present Draft, supra note 3, at 8; see Working Document, supra note 332, at 2.
337. See Working Document, supra note 332, at 2.
338. Id.; see Present Draft, supra note 3, at 4.
339. Working Document, supra note 332, at 2.
340. Present Draft, supra note 3, at 13.
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or one of the licensees refuses to meet such demand from the
territory of other licensees (passive sales)." '341 Section 11 automatically removes an agreement from the block exemption if any of the
parties try to prevent passive sales out of, or parallel imports 342 into,
343
any licensed territory.
The removal of the turnover requirement reveals a number of
important changes in the Commission's attitude toward territorial
sales restrictions. First, the Commission removed the turnover requirement because it has been "persuaded, while not having been
entirely convinced, ' 344 that all licensors need protection against
active and passive competition from their licensees. 345 This change
is a direct result of the response by interested parties to the Commission's position that a size limitation would help small and mediumsized business. 346 The Commission has been "persuaded" by the
argument that, without territorial sales restrictions, the licensor
"might be tempted to exploit his knowledge himself in the framework of an integrated industrial project, thus refusing the dissemination of his technology notably to the very [small and medium' 347
sized enterprises] which the draft aims to protect."
Second, the idea that small and medium-sized businesses are
the only ones that need territorial sales restrictions in order to
protect themselves from the risk of investment 348 has been abandoned. 34 The Commission has accepted the argument that territorial sales restrictions encourage all licensees to make the investments
necessary to get new inventions off the ground, 350 because all of
them are protected against active and passive competition from the
352
licensor, 35 1 and against active competition from other licensees.
Thus, the Commission need not discriminate on the basis of size

341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Working Document, supra note 332, at 5.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 4; see also supra notes 70-94 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of
the turnover requirement).
347. Working Document, supra note 332, at 4-5.
348. See supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
349. See Working Document, supra note 332, at 5.
350. See id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
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within the regulation because a "balanced network of licensees" 353
allows small, medium and large firms to compete under the same
"equitable conditions of exploitation." 354
Finally, it is the licensor's responsibility to create this "balanced network of licensees. ' 355 The Present Draft awards the licensor "maximum freedom" to "adopt the licensing structure which
will create and maintain the optimal incentive for each of the
economic agents involved. ' 356 Thus, the Commission has decided
not to regulate the structure of patent licensing agreements as
strictly as it has in the prior drafts. 357 Instead, it "has chosen to
adopt very generous principles which allow the licensor maximum
freedom but also leave him all his responsibilities." 358 The Commission is working with industry to promote economic integration by
simplifying the proposed regulation, 359 and "encouraging the conclusion of patent licensing agreements conceived in a common market context."3 6 0 However, it has added sections 10 and 11 to article
3 so that the agreements will be excluded from the block exemption
36 1
if parties try to abuse this freedom.
B. Field of Use Restrictions
The field of use provision remains virtually intact. The only
change is the deletion of the word "distinct" from the phrase "distinct technical fields of application.1 3 2 The Commission does not
give any reason for this change, but it is fair to say that the change
was made in the spirit of simplification that underlies the Present
Draft.363

353. Id. at 3.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. For example, by no longer having a turnover provision that expressly favors small
and medium-size businesses over large ones, the Commission has stopped telling licensors
which licensees they should choose.
358. Working Document, supra note 337, at 3.
359. Id. at 7.
360. Id. at 3.
361. Present Draft, supra note 3, at 4, 13; see Working Document, supra note 337, at 6.
362. Compare Present Draft, supra note 3, at 8-9 (new provision) with supra notes 29195 and accompanying text (discussing the provision in the Fifth Draft).
363. See Working Document, supra note 337, at 7.
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C. Restrictions Relating to Know-how
The Commission has removed from the Present Draft sections
10 and 12 of article 3 of the Fifth Draft.364 These provisions expressly prohibited restrictions on the use of know-how after the
expiration of the license 36 5 and on its use outside the licensed territory or in a territory where a parallel patent exists. 36 The Commission does not include these provisions in the PresentDraft because it
claims not to have enough experience in dealing with these types of
obligations. 36 7 It reasons that these types of obligations deal strictly
with know-how, whereas the present regulation deals with know368
how agreements only insofar as they accompany patent licenses.
Therefore, it will not "prejudge the way in which they are to be
evaluated in the context of this draft. ' 369 Any future treatment of
these provisions will probably be in the context of a block exemp370
tion for know-how licensing.
Furthermore, the first paragraph of article 1 makes all the
provisions in the article applicable to mixed patent and know-how
licenses. 37' This is true only where "the licensed patents are essential
for achieving the objects of the licensed technology and as long as at
least one licensed patent remains in force." 372 However, the knowhow must be "confidential" 373 and must represent a "certain ad374
vance in the state of the art."
D. Royalties and Quantity Restrictions
Section 4 of article 3375 has been modified in accordance with
the comments the Commission received on royalty payment. 376 The

364. Working Document, supra note 332, at 11; see supra notes 309-24 and accompanying text.
365. Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 15.
366. Id.
367. Working Document, supra note 332, at 10.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See Panel Discussion, supra note 106, at 171-72.
371. Present Draft, supra note 3, at 8; Working Document, supra note 332, at 8.
372. Present Draft, supra note 3, at 3.
373. Working Document, supra note 332, at 8. The Commission defines "confidential"
as "secret." Id.
374. Present Draft, supra note 3, at 3.
375. Id. at 12.
376. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
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section now permits an arrangement whereby the licensee pays
royalties on products not covered by the licensed patent or knowhow if the arrangement was entered into to facilitate payment by
377
the licensee.
Maximum quantity restrictions are still prohibited by article
3(5),378 but more importantly, minimum quantity restrictions have
been moved from article 1 to article 2.371 This means that these
restrictions are exemptable. 380 They are now among the obligations
that are "not normally restrictive of competition" 38'I but which are
listed in the regulation so that they may benefit from the exemption
if particular economic or legal circumstances bring them within the
scope of article 85(1).382
E. Article 4 Exemptions
The new version of article 4383 is not significantly different
from the version in the Fifth Draft.384 The underlying question is
whether this procedure should cover "all of the grey area between
exempted agreements and those contained in Article 3" or whether
it should be confined only to "restrictions which by their nature, or
effects correspond to those listed in Articles 1 or 2." 385 The Commission has invited member states to express their views on this ques386
tion.
Throughout the process of drafting this regulation, the Commission has examined the arguments made by all interested parties.
It has also used recent developments in Community law to bring
the proposed regulation into line with the reasoning of the Court of
Justice. 387

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Present Draft, supra note 3, at 12; Working Document, supra note 332, at 9.
Present Draft, supra note 3, at 12.
Working Document, supra note 332, at 9; see Present Draft, supra note 3, at 10.
Working Document, supra note 332, at 9.
See Present Draft, supra note 3, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 14.
See Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 16.
See Working Document, supra note 332, at 10.
Id.
See infra notes 388-423 and accompanying text.
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VI. MAIZE SEED, CODITEL AND THE
BLOCK EXEMPTION
A. Maize Seed and the Fifth Draft
Clearly the most subtly complex change in the block exemption
is the application of the Court of Justice's reasoning in the Maize
Seed and Coditel decisions to the proposed regulation. 3 8 The Court
in Maize Seed did not hold that all "open" exclusive licensing
agreements do not violate article 85(1),389 but rather, only those

meeting the criteria set out by the Court. 390 Consequently, the
391
Commission must determine, using the Court's requirements,
which particular "open" licenses are outside the scope of article
85.392
As a result of Maize Seed, the Commission extended the scope
of the Fifth Draft to allow all "open" patent licensing agreements to
come under the block exemption, whether they met the Court's
criteria 39 3 or not.3 94 Thus, the Fifth Draft represented an effort to
provide legal certainty to firms that might have been unsure where
35
their particular agreements stood after Maize Seed.
The Fifth Draft, however, was somewhat confusing in its
distinction of the types of "open" licenses which would be exempt
under the regulation. 396 "Open" licenses containing territorial sales
restrictions that did not meet the Court's criteria were exempt only
in the case of small and medium-sized businesses. 3 7 "Open" licenses
containing territorial manufacturing restrictions that did not meet

388. See Present Draft, supra note 3, at 3-4; Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 2.
389. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
390. See id.
391. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
392. See van der Esch, supra note 307, at __.
393. Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 2. Article 2(1)(1) allows an "open" license provided
that it is "necessary for the introduction and protection of a new technology in the licensed
territory, in view of the importance of research carried out and the risk incurred in manufacturing and selling a product unfamiliar to consumers in the licensed territory when the
agreement was entered into." 1d.
394. Id. at 2. Article 1(1)(2) exempts an "open" license even if it does "not satisfy the
tests established by the Court." Id.; see id. at 9 (article 1(1)(2)).
395. See van der Esch, supra note 307, at __
396. See Fifth Draft, supra note 7, at 2.
397. See id. at 9.
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the Court's criteria were exempt in every case. 398 Furthermore,
"open" licenses that met the Court's criteria were listed in article
2
in case their "anti-competitive effect [might] come into question." 3 9 This confusion was further compounded by the inclusion
of the word "sell" in article 2(1)(1),400 because it was not clear
whether a firm prohibited from imposing territorial sales restrictions under article 1401 could still impose them if it met the criteria
of article 2.402
Consequently, the Fifth Draft can be seen as an attempt to
integrate the Maize Seed and Coditel decisions into the block exemption. The problems resulting from this integration have been
40

cleared up by the Present Draft.

3

B. Maize Seed, Coditel and the Present Draft
The Present Draft represents a better integration of the Maize
Seed and Coditel cases into the block exemption in a number of
ways. First, by removing the turnover requirement from the
Present Draft,40 4 the Commission has also removed the cause of the
confusion regarding the exemptability of "open" licenses. This is
because there is no longer a need to distinguish between "open"
licenses for small and medium-sized firms and "open" licenses for
large firms. 405 In protecting each licensee vis-a-vis the licensor by
allowing all "open" licenses to come under the exemption, 400 the

Commission obviates the need to expressly include in article 2 those
licenses which meet the Court's criteria. 40 7 As a result, the simpli398. See id. at 9, 12.
399. Id. at 12.
400. Id.
401. See id. at 10.
402. Id. at 12.
[P]rovided that such obligations are necessary for the introduction and protection of
the new technology in the licensed territory, in view of the importance of the
research carried out and the risk incurred in manufacturing and selling a product
unfamiliar to consumers in the licensed territory when the agreement was entered
into.
Id.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See infra notes 404-23 and accompanying text.
Working Document, supra note 332, at 5.
See supra notes 396-413 and accompanying text.
See Working Document, supra note 332, at 4.
See Present Draft, supra note 3, at 3-4; Working Document, supra note 332, at 9.
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fied regulation is "more comprehensible to the enterprises to which
40 8
it addresses itself and . . . increase[s] their legal certainty."
However, the Commission indicates that it has not gone beyond the
Court's judgment by applying the exemption to all "open" licenses. 40 9 It notes that the exemption is based not on the theory of
"non-application of article 85(1)" of the Treaty of Rome, 410 but on
4
its exemption power under article 85(3). 1
Second, the Present Draft does not allow application of the
block exemption to absolute territorial sales restrictions, 412 that is,
to "closed" licenses. 41 3 A manufacturer cannot be forced to ensure
that his customers are not exporters or to refuse to sell to them to
prevent parallel exports. 4 14 Such obligations would remove the
agreement from protection under the block exemption. 415 Thus, it
may safely be said that, in the context of patent licensing, sections
417
10 and 11 of article 3416 will act to "close" an "open" license
where the parties act to eliminate all competition from third par418
ties.
Finally, the Present Draft also parallels the Court of Justice's
reasoning in the Coditel49l case. In Coditel, the Court distinguished
between the "existence" of a right and its "exercise, ' 420 and held
that its mere existence did not violate article 85(1), but that is
exercise might. 421 The Commission has taken a similar approach in
the Present Draft. It allows for the existence of territorial sales
restrictions, 42 2 but makes their wrongful exercise a cause for losing

408. See Working Document, supra note 332, at 7.
409. Id. at 4.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 6.
413. Compare id. at 6 (discussing absolute territorial restrictions) with supra notes 157,
160 and accompanying text (discussing "closed" licenses).
414. Working Document, supra note 332, at 6.
415. Id.
416. Present Draft, supra note 3, at 13.
417. See supra notes 219, 225 and accompanying text.
418. Working Document, supra note 332, at 6; see Present Draft, supra note 3, at 13.
419. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3381, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865.
420. See supra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
421. Id.
422. See Present Draft, supra note 3, at 8.
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the exemption. 423 Thus the Commission has changed its approach
from prejudging the validity of the mere existence of territorial sales
restrictions to focusing on possible abusive exercise of those restrictions.
CONCLUSION
The Present Draft reflects a careful balance between the demands of industry and the needs of the Community in a number of
ways. First, it shows that in removing the turnover requirement,
the Commission takes into account more than economic criteria
when implementing Community competition policy. The Commission has been persuaded by its critics that small and medium-sized
businesses will benefit if all businesses are allowed to impose territorial sales restrictions. Thus, the Present Draft is based on the idea
that in a balanced network of licensees, small, medium and large
firms compete under the same equitable conditions of exploitation.
Second, the Commission is easing its attitude toward knowhow. It has substantially altered the block exemption with regard to
restrictions on know-how from the Fourth Draft to the Present
Draft by making all of article 1 applicable to mixed patent and
know-how licenses. Furthermore, the Commission has removed
provisions that solely regulate know-how because it does not have
experience with these types of restrictions. Yet, it does not prejudge
them by including them in a regulation aimed primarily at mixed
patent and know-how licenses. This indicates that the Commission
is beginning to view know-how as an important and valuable industrial property in its own right, which may merit its own block
exemption.
Third, the addition of article 4 to the Fifth and Present Drafts
allows the regulation to grow beyond its present scope by providing
an accelerated notification procedure for agreements analogous to
those in article 1. It is foreseeable that this provision may engender
a list of "article 4 exemptions" that are not expressly listed in the
original regulation but are incorporated through later action by the
Commission.
Finally, the PresentDraft, in the wake of Maize Seed, provides
legal certainty to all "open" patent licensing agreements by extend423. Id. at 13; see Working Document, supra note 332, at 6.
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ing the exemption beyond the factors set out by the Court of Justice.
However, the inclusion of the Maize Seed reasoning in the regulation does not settle the issue of whether a "rule of reason" approach
may be applied outside technology transfers. In matters other than
technology transfers, industry must turn to Coditel for guidance.
Josf E. Gonzdlez

